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We develop a model of internal governance where the self-serving actions of top 
management are limited by the potential reaction of subordinates. We find that internal 
governance can mitigate agency problems and ensure firms have substantial value, even 
without any external governance. Internal governance seems to work best when both top 
management and subordinates are important to value creation. We then allow for 
governance provided by external financiers and find situations where external 
governance, even if crude and uninformed, complements internal governance in 
improving efficiency. Interestingly, this allows us to develop a theory of dividend policy, 
where dividends are paid by self-interested CEOs to maintain a balance between internal 
and external control. Finally, we explore how the internal organization of firms may be 
structured to enhance the role of internal governance. Our paper could explain why young 
firms with limited external oversight, and firms in countries with poor external 
governance, can have substantial value, and why improving external governance may not 
be a panacea for all governance problems.    
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The common view of the public corporation is that of an organization run by top managers, and 
monitored by a board of directors on behalf of public shareholders. The separation of decision 
management (the CEO) from decision control (the board) and from risk-bearing (public 
shareholders) is thought of as a reasonable way to structure firm governance (see Fama and 
Jensen (1983 a b), Jensen (2000)), and so long as decisions are made in the interests of the 
residual claimants, efficiency is maximized.  
Yet the clear evidence that the public corporation has survival value has to be set against 
the equally clear evidence that most shareholders have little control over boards (see, for 
example, Monks (2007)), that many boards are poorly informed and have little ability to 
scrutinize top management’s decisions (see, for example, Mace (1971)), and some CEOs are self 
interested rather than working for shareholders (see, for example, Jensen (1986, 1993), Morck, 
Shleifer and Vishny  (1989), and Shleifer and Vishny (1989, 1997)). Admittedly, the market for 
corporate control can offer some discipline, but it is hard to see it as effective in controlling 
operational decisions. How then do we reconcile the survival, and hence presumed efficiency, of 
the public corporation with the ineffectiveness of the supposed channels through which it is 
governed?      
 We will argue in this paper that there are important stakeholders in the firm, such as 
critical employees, who care about its future even if the CEO has short horizons and is self-
interested and shareholders are dispersed and powerless. These stakeholders, because of their 
power to withdraw their contributions to the firm, can force a self-interested myopic CEO to act 
in a more public spirited and far-sighted way. We call this process “internal governance”.  
 The main departure of this paper from much of the existing literature is to not treat the 
firm as a monolithic single-employee entity, but to see it as composed of diverse agents with 
different horizons, different opportunities for misappropriation or growth, and different interests. 
To fix ideas, think of a partnership run by an old CEO who is about to retire, and who has a 
young manager working under him. Three ingredients go into producing the firm’s current cash 
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flows. First, the firm’s capital stock, which could be the firm’s stock of physical capital 
(machines), or organizational capital (networks), or relationship capital (client relationships); 
Second, the CEO’s ability to manage the firm based on his talent and his knowledge of its 
specific problems; Third, the young manager’s effort, which allows her to learn to deal with the 
firm’s specific issues.  
 We assume the cash flow is unverifiable as produced. However, the CEO can put in place 
internal audit and accounting mechanisms that would make a pre-determined portion of the cash 
flows verifiable, and ensure they are channeled into investment.2 The CEO can appropriate the 
cash flow that remains unverifiable – more generally, he can consume perks, “tunnel” cash out of 
the firm through self-dealing, or even not generate the cash by shirking on the job.  
Note that because the CEO has a short horizon, he could simply decide to appropriate all 
the cash. However, in order to generate the cash in the first place he needs the young manager to 
put in effort. If she sees little future in the firm because the CEO invests nothing, the young 
manager will have little incentive to exert effort in management and on-the-job learning. This will 
reduce cash flows considerably. To forestall this, the CEO will commit to investing some fraction 
of the cash flows in order to preserve a future for his young employee, thereby motivating her. 
Intuitively, the need to motivate employees forces the CEO to invest, and thus leave a portion of 
the cash flows behind when he departs the firm.3  This allows the firm to build substantial 
amounts of capital stock and value, despite being led by a sequence of myopic and rapacious 
CEOs. 
We show that internal governance is most effective when neither the CEO nor the 
manager dominate in contributions to the firm’s cash flows. Intuitively, if the CEO dominates, he 
has no desire to provide incentives for the manager. If the manager’s contributions dominate, the 
                                                 
2 They could also be paid out as dividends, but we will come to this later. 
3 It is hard to write contracts with the CEO on investment since both the quantity and quality of investment 
should depend on business conditions, and the CEO’s business judgment, all of which are hard to specify 
ex ante. Managerial learning effort is equally hard to contract upon, though it can be rewarded ex post 
through promotion (see Prendergast (1993)). 
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manager has little incentive to learn because she cannot appropriate cash flows today, and the 
learning will be of little use when she does become CEO and can appropriate cash flows. Also, 
because both contemporaneous and forward looking elements of the business environment matter 
for participant incentives, internal governance works best when the business environment is 
stable.   
  Indeed, in this framework it may not make sense to strengthen external institutions such 
as courts so as to increase the costs of appropriation (for example, by increasing the propensity of 
courts to investigate and punish such appropriation). One might think that this would make the 
CEO more willing to invest at the margin because his cost of appropriation would have increased. 
However, because the manager no longer sees as many rents in the future, her incentive to exert 
effort can fall, and the CEO’s desire to invest in order to incentivize that effort can also fall. 4 
Overall efficiency can be reduced dramatically.   
 There may, however, be merit in some forms of external control exercised by investors. 
We have implicitly assumed so far that the firm’s capital stock is in intangible assets such as the 
human capital of employees or client relationships, which cannot be seized or sold. But what if 
the investment were instead in tangible assets, such as machines or land, which could be seized 
and sold? This would then offer a role for outside equity, and would allow the firm to be 
structured as a public corporation.  
 To see this, we assume that, in the spirit of Myers (2000), outside equity has the capacity 
(through the board of directors) to periodically exercise its fairly crude ownership right of taking 
over control of the assets. Outside equity thus has no direct effect over the investment or effort 
decision – it has no operational influence. Even so, it turns out that the act of going public 
followed by the exercise of even these crude control rights can greatly enhance investment by the 
CEO and the value of the firm. In our framework, the improvement is not because outside equity 
                                                 
4 This point is reminiscent of Shleifer and Summers (1988), but their focus was on raiders breaking implicit 
contracts in the firm and thus transferring value. 
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monitors the actions of the CEO, but primarily because equity holders are indifferent between 
being paid in cash or being “paid”  via [the control rights inherent in] a higher capital stock. For 
the CEO, the dollar paid out as dividends and the dollar left behind as investment costs the same, 
but the CEO prefers to “pay” by investing to increase capital stock because this will have the 
collateral effect of motivating greater effort by the manager. This could explain the reluctance of 
firms to pay dividends, even when returns on investment are not great. 
 Eventually, though, as the rate of return on capital falls, by investing more capital the 
CEO could make the manager worse off, because he increases the capacity of outside equity to 
extract value by more than he increases the capacity of the manager to generate cash (net of this 
period’s effort cost) as CEO next period. This is when the current CEO will switch to paying 
dividends – not because of the pressures exerted by outside equity alone, but because more 
investment will de-motivate managers. This then gives us a dividend policy in firms run by self-
interested CEOs that corresponds to the life cycle of a firm and its investment policy, with 
dividends not being paid when the firm is young and investment profitable, and dividends being 
paid when the firm is mature.  
 Interestingly, this combination of internal and external governance can eliminate the rents 
extracted by management, even though equity’s control rights are so crude. Other forms of 
providing incentives do not always fare so well.  We examine whether giving the CEO equity-
based compensation can improve matters. It turns out that under a variety of circumstances, it 
does not – interestingly, the limited control rights possessed by outside equity imply that equity 
values do not reflect the entirety of cash flows produced by the firm. Indeed, the dictum to 
maximize equity value may offer little relevant guidance in such firms.    
Finally, the way the firm is structured internally can influence the process of internal 
governance.  Indeed, one of the roles of the venture capitalist in young firms may be to choose the 
allocation of work between the CEO and subordinate managers appropriately so as to make the 
firm governable (see Hellman and Puri (2002). Also, when there is more than one subordinate, 
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other aspects of internal organization, such as the nature of competition between subordinates to 
succeed the CEO, can enhance the effectiveness of internal governance. Indeed, we only touch on 
the range of  possible interesting interactions between internal organization and internal 
governance.  
     Our point, more generally, is that the traditional description of the firm in the first 
paragraph falls short on three counts. First, control need not be exerted just top down, or from 
outside, it can also be asserted bottom-up. Put differently, the CEO has to give his subordinates a 
reason to follow, and this, implicitly, is how they control him. Second, the view that there is one 
residual claimant in the firm, the shareholder, is probably too narrow. Anyone who shares in the 
quasi-rents generated by the firm has some residual claims and thus there is no easy equivalence 
between maximizing shareholder value and maximizing efficiency. Third, the fact that different 
parties have claims to different residual rents at different horizons means each one has to pay 
attention to others’ residual claims in order to elicit co-operation. The checks that parties inside 
the firm impose on each other ensure the firm functions reasonably well, even if outside control is 
weak.     
 While our CEO is myopic and self interested, in reduced form he appears to act as if he 
cares about his subordinates and the survival of the firm. Indeed, Donaldson and Lorsch (1983) 
suggest from their interviews of top CEOs that continuity of the firm, rather than maximizing 
shareholder value, appears to be the primary stated objective of CEOs. Of course, most CEOs are 
not the caricatures that economic models like ours make them out to be, yet it is reassuring that 
even though we imbue them with no redeeming qualities, the model still has them doing 
reasonably good things for the firm.  
The model can be applied to answer a variety of questions, ranging from why stocks in 
countries with poor minority investor protection have non-negligible value, to when firms are 
most likely to overinvest, and when firms ought to go public or private. It also offers some novel 
implications, for example on the relative importance of external governance in firms with a young 
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CEO or workforce versus its importance in firms with an older CEO or workforce. It could even 
be applied to improve our understanding of the recent breakdown of internal governance in 
financial firms. 
  Our work suggests that perhaps then one should think of the firm less as a top-down 
hierarchy led by a board-monitored CEO, and more as a restricted market where it is not from the 
benevolence of the participants that we expect value creation but from the checks and balances 
they impose on each other in furthering their own interest. Implicit in our framework is, therefore, 
a theory of the firm and its boundaries. In our view, the firm is an agglomeration of assets and 
specialized human capital which give it unique capabilities (see, for example, Penrose (1959), 
Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1990), and Rajan and Zingales (1998, 2001)). The 
literature suggests the ability to control access to the rents the firm generates is top management’s 
source of control. In this paper, we focus on the “bottom-up” influence over firm actions, 
exercised by those who have access but do not yet have explicit control, because of their ability to 
affect the firm’s rents. More generally, internal checks and balances may be an important, and 
under-researched, aspect of firm governance. 
 Our paper relates to important work by Fama and Jensen (1983 a and b), Allen and Gale 
(2000) and Landier, Sraer, and Thesmar (2006,2008). We will explain the connections once we 
lay out the basic model. The rest of the paper is as follows. In section I, we present the framework 
for a simple model; in section II, we solve it and analyze different outcomes. We then explore the 
role of dispersed outside equity in section III, and discuss extensions of the model, especially to 
internal organization issues, in section IV. We conclude with a discussion of the empirical 
implications of the model.  
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I. The model 
 
Consider a firm with a two-level managerial hierarchy. At the top of the managerial hierarchy is a 
CEO who is old. In the second layer is a manager who is young. Each agent can work, at most, 
for 2 periods.  
The cash flow generated by the firm is unverifiable to begin with. At the beginning of 
each period t, the current CEO decides the internal audit and accounting procedures to put in 
place. More comprehensive procedures allow more of the cash flows the firm generates to be 
made verifiable and applied to investment (later, we will examine the choice between applying 
these cash flows to investment and to payments to external claim holders). Thus the current CEO 
can determine what the firm’s end-of-period capital stock, tk , will be. The manager then decides 
how much he will engage in firm specific learning effort, ts , at a personal cost of  ts .  
1.1. Learning by doing 
 Firm-specific learning is important for a manager to be effective – in a consumer product 
firm, for example, it may entail visiting vendors and the customers in the market repeatedly and 
understanding the ways they buy and use the product.  Not only does such learning help generate 
business and contribute to firm cash flows when the manager is young (it is thus a form of effort 
and we will use the terms “learning” and “effort” interchangeably), it also helps him make better 
decisions if he is made CEO – for even though such knowledge may be critical for the CEO to 
function effectively, it may be much harder to acquire at the CEO level where vendors and 
customers will be far more circumspect, and the CEO’s time more limited.5 More specifically, at 
the end of any period t, the firm generates cash flows   
 ( )1 1( , , ) [ ( ) ( )]CEO CEOt t t t t tC k s s k f s g sγθ− −= +  (1.1) 
                                                 
5 The literature has called such learning “organizational capital” (Atkeson and Kehoe, 2005, and Lustig, 
Syverson and Nieuwerburgh, 2008, being some recent examples). 
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tθ  is a measure of how favorable the business environment is at time t for generating cash flows, 
and γ  is a constant less than one.  Function f indicates the CEO’s contribution to cash flows, 
and its argument, CEOs , is the firm-specific learning acquired by the CEO when he was a young 
manager (that is, in period t-1). Function g captures the manager’s contribution to cash flows, 
with ts  being the learning effort the manager exerts at time t. Both f and g are increasing and 
concave.  All agents maximize the present discounted value of their remaining lifetime income. 
The discount rate applied to next period’s cash flows is (1+r).    
1.2. Appropriation 
We assume employee wages are normalized to zero. We also assume an extreme form of 
agency problem to fix ideas; The CEO appropriates the cash flow that is not made verifiable, that 
is, he appropriates 1 1( )t t t t t tcash flow investment C k k C k k− −− = − − = + − .6   
At the end of every period, the current CEO retires, so he has no direct incentive to 
preserve firm value for the future. The next CEO is the current manager, who is the only one with 
the necessary human capital to succeed. We will later examine more detailed models of  CEO 
selection.   
1.3. Timing. 
Critical in what follows is that the CEO will determine the portion of cash flows he will 
make verifiable (and thus the firm’s investment) before the manager engages in learning effort. In 
practice, the steps may be more incremental. The CEO will articulate his investment strategy 
(e.g., investing in China) and will take the incremental actions consistent with that vision. For 
instance, he could order the capital equipment, arrange for the land, or hire new workers (all to be 
                                                 
6 It is most convenient, mathematically speaking, to allow the CEO to choose the end-of-period capital 
stock tk  rather than (net) 1t tinvestment k k −= − . However, it is possible that net investment could be 
negative. A high (un-modeled) depreciation rate for old capital will allow us to have a declining capital 
stock even with positive gross investment. Alternatively, we have to allow for the possibility that some 
portion of the old capital stock is also unverifiable, which allows the CEO to set the new capital stock 
below the level of the old. We will ignore this complication in what follows, though it is easily handled. 
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paid for out of cash flow).  The manager will respond to each incremental action with incremental 
effort. It is natural, therefore, to think of the CEO’s commitment to the investment strategy as 
coming first in a leader-follower relationship.7 The timing each period then is 
Period t                          Period t+1… 
CEO hires 
manager. 
CEO commits 
to end-of-
period capital 
stock tk  
Manager 
engages in  
learning effort 
ts  
Cash generated. 
Investment 
made. CEO 
gets residual.  
CEO 
retires. 
Manager 
becomes 
CEO. 
 
Figure 1: Timeline 
II. Outcomes 
We now solve the model and see what it implies for CEO investment and managerial effort. 
2.1. First best level of investment. 
Inspection suggests that the first best level of capital is    
 ( )
1
1
1
1( ) ( )1
FB FB FBt
t t tk f s g sr
γθ −+
+
⎡ ⎤= +⎢ ⎥+⎣ ⎦  (1.2) 
 
 where 1,
FB FB
t ts s +  are first best levels of learning effort.
8 Similarly, FBts solves 
 ( )1 1( ) ( ) ( ) 11 FB FB FB FBt t t t t tk f s k g sr γ γθ θ+ −′ ′+ =+  (1.3) 
 
Thus the first-best level of investment increases with the prospective quality of the business 
environment, 1tθ + , and importantly, does not directly depend on the current business environment 
                                                 
7 Indeed, CEO’s inability to deviate ex post from an investment path could also be viewed as an outcome of 
the monitoring, or more generally, internal governance, imposed by second-line managers. In alternate 
settings, such commitment may arise as “leadership” on part of a long-term CEO, attempting to coordinate 
actions of subordinates in a time-consistent manner (Bolton, Brunnermeier and Veldkarmp, 2008).  
8 Formally, the first-best solves for investment and managerial learning pairs (kt, st) for all t, so as to 
maximize the discounted sum of cash flows net of investment and managerial effort, where the net cash 
flow in period t is given by Ct(kt-1 ,st-1 ,st), as  in equation (1.1), minus [(kt - kt-1)+ st]. 
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tθ . In contrast, the first-best level of managerial learning depends both on the current as well as 
the future business environment since it affects current as well as future cash flows.   
2.2. Second best 
In the second best, there is no direct rationale for the current CEO to commit to invest 
any of the cash flow. Investment puts the cash flow beyond his reach and his limited horizon 
implies he will see none of the future returns from investment.  
However, there is a kind of contemporaneous settling up because the CEO’s investment 
affects the future income of his manager, and therefore their incentive to engage in learning 
effort, and thus the firm’s cash flows, today. To see this simple point, start first by writing down 
the CEO’s income. It is  
 ( )1 1 1 1( , , ) ( ) [ ( ) ( )] ( )CEO SB CEO SBt t t t t t t t t tC k s s k k k f s g s k kγθ− − − −− − = + − −  (1.4) 
where SBts  is the manager’s (second-best) equilibrium learning.  Differentiating w.r.t. tk , we see 
that the CEO’s marginal net return from investing is  
 ( )1 1
SB
t
t t
t
dsk g
dk
γθ − ′ −  (1.5). 
The net return  depends on current business conditions tθ  and capital stock 1tk −  because these 
determine the cash flow impact of any increase in the manager’s learning effort induced by CEO 
investment. Critically, it also depends on 
SB
t
t
ds
dk
 - how the manager’s optimal learning effort 
varies with investment. Indeed, this sensitivity of effort to investment is the channel through 
which the CEO’s investment feeds back into contemporaneous cash flows, and will be a central 
focus in what follows. To see how this is determined, first note the manager chooses SBts to 
maximize his future rents as CEO. That is, he maximizes 
( )1 1 11 [ ( ) ( )] ( )1 t t t t t t tk f s g s k k sr
γθ + + +⎡ ⎤+ − − −⎣ ⎦+ .    (1.6) 
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Differentiating and setting equal to zero, we get 
 ( )1 ( ) 1
1
SBt
t tk f sr
γθ + ′ =+  (1.7) 
 
So ( )
1
1
1SB
t
t t
rs f
k γθ
−
+
⎛ ⎞+′= ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
. Since f ′ is decreasing, we see that, ceteris paribus, the less the 
future is discounted or better the expected future environment, 1tθ + , or more the capital stock tk  
the CEO leaves behind, the greater the learning.   
Now totally differentiating the manager’s first order condition (1.7) and rearranging,  
 
SB
t
t t
ds f
dk k f
γ ′−= ′′  (1.8) 
which is positive, implying that even a myopic CEO has incentives to invest for the future in 
order to motivate his manager today. Further specialization of functions allows us to obtain 
closed form solutions. 
2.3. Specializing functions.  
Let g fα = , that is for the same amount of learning, the contribution of the CEO to cash flows 
is α times that of the managers. Further, let 
11( ) ( )
1
b
b
t tf s a bsb
−
= +−  with a ≥ 0 and b > 1. 
Substituting these assumptions in (1.8), then (1.5), we get,                                                                                                 
 ( ) 11( ) bSB bt t t tk k a bsγ γθ α
−
−= +  (1.9) 
Substituting f in (1.7) and rearranging, we get 
 ( ) ( )1 11SB tbt ta bs kr γθ ++ = +  (1.10) 
This then gives us  
 ( )11
1
b
SB t
t t
as k
b b r
γθ +− ⎛ ⎞= + ⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠  (1.11) 
Note that given capital stock tk , the manager’s effort, 
SB
ts , depends only on the future  
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business environment and the end-of-period capital stock, even though it affects current cash 
flow. This is because the manager does not share in current period rents – his horizon is different. 
Of course, the current environment will affect his choice, but only through  tk . Substituting 
(1.10) in (1.9) and simplifying, we get 
 ( )
1
1 1
1 1
11
b b
t b
t t tk kr
γ γ γ
γ γθγ θα
− + −
+ + −−
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞= ⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 (1.12) 
 Interestingly, the business environment today, tθ , and beginning-of-period capital stock, 
1tk −  influence the end-of-period capital stock, even though they have no effect on the returns 
produced by that capital stock (which are driven by 1tθ + ). The intuition is simple – end-of-period 
capital adds to the CEO’s income only by enhancing his subordinate’s learning by doing today. 
That, in turn, matters more for current cash flows if today’s business environment is good or if 
current capital stock is high. Put another way, appropriating an additional dollar is more attractive 
for the CEO if today’s environment is bad, or if the firm’s capital stock is small, because the 
associated decline in effort by his employee does less absolute damage. Finally, the greater the 
relative contribution of the manager to cash flows, 
1
α , the greater is the desire of the CEO to 
motivate learning effort by increasing investment. 
Steady state 
  In steady state, 1
SS
t tθ θ θ+ = =  and the second best steady state 1 SBt tk k k−= = . 
Substituting in (1.12), and simplifying, we get 
 
( ) 11
1(1 )
b bSS
SB
bk r
γθγ
α
−
−
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥= ⎢ ⎥+⎣ ⎦
 (1.13) 
From (1.12) and (1.13) we have  
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1 1
1 0
t
b b
t t
SB SB SB
k k k
k k k
γ γ
γ γ γ γ
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟+ − + −⎝ ⎠−⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= =⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠  (1.14) 
Thus any initial capital stock converges to steady state if 
1b γ< .  Steady state managerial 
learning and cash flow net of investment and learning effort can also be calculated using 
equations (1.11) and (1.1).   
 In Figures 2a, 2b and 2c, we plot the convergence to the steady state of investment, 
managerial learning and net cash flow, respectively, for two initial conditions – one that has 
initial investment above the steady state and one that has below.  This numerical example (and 
the ones to follow) employ benchmark parameter values (1+r)-1 = 0.95, γ = 0.2, (b-1)/b = 0.3, α = 
0.5, a = 0, and θSS = 1. As the plots reveal, convergence is almost fully achieved within five CEO 
tenure periods.  Further, as is clear from equation (1.14) and the plots, the convergence rate is 
faster when the firm is farther from the steady state in its initial condition. 
Comparison to the first-best steady state 
We can also determine the steady state under the first best. Substituting the specific form 
for f and g in (1.2) and (1.3), simplifying and solving, we get 
 
1
1 11 1
1 1
b b b
FB rk
r b
γγ θ α α
α α
− −⎡ ⎤+ + +⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞= ⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟+ −⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 (1.15) 
Comparing the ratio of the second best steady state in (1.13) with the first best steady state capital 
stock above, we get 
1
1
1
(1 )
1 1
1
b
SB
bFB
k r
k r
b
γ
α α
α
−
−
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥+⎢ ⎥= ⎢ ⎥+ + +⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
(1.16).  It can be shown that the ratio in 
(1.16) is smaller than one. Note that (somewhat surprisingly) the ratio is independent of the 
steady state business conditions. Finally, as can be verified analytically and as also shown in 
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Figure 3a, as 0α → or α →∞ , the ratio in square brackets tends to zero, suggesting that the 
capital stock under the second best agency solution tends to zero relative to the first best level. 
 The intuition is interesting. α represents the relative importance of the CEO in generating cash 
flows. If α is very high, the CEO does not really need the manager’s effort, and hence sees little 
need to invest. If α  is very low, today’s manager, who reaps the benefit of his effort only when 
he is CEO, sees little merit in exerting effort, because that effort will do little to enhance his 
future rents. Indeed it is easily seen the ratio is maximized at a positive, finite level of α .   
Turn next to cash flows.  
( )
( )
1(1 ) ( )
1(1 ) ( )
SB SB
SB
FB
FB FB
k f sCF
CF k f s
γ
γ
α
α
+
=
+
.   Substituting values9, we get 
 
1
1
(1 )
1 1
1
b
b
SB
bFB
b
CF r
CF r
b
γ
γ
γα α
α
−
−
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥+⎢ ⎥= ⎢ ⎥+ + +⎢ ⎥⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥−⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
 (1.17) 
As with investments, the ratio of the agency-modulated second-best cash flow to the first best 
cash flow is smaller than one and independent of steady-state business condition.10 We 
summarize this discussion in the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 1:  Under stable business conditions, second-best investment, managerial learning 
and cash flows are all smaller relative to their first-best counterparts. Further, the efficiency of 
the organization in generating cash flows, measured as ratio of cash flows under the second-best 
                                                 
9 From (1.10), we get ( ) 11( ) 1 1
b
SB SBf s k
b r
γθ −⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟− +⎝ ⎠ . Similarly, we can show from (1.3) that 
( ) 11 1( ) .
1 1
b
FB FBrf s k
b r
γθ α
α
−+ +⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟− +⎝ ⎠ . 
10 From an efficiency standpoint, it is more appropriate to focus on cash flows net of investment and 
managerial effort. It turns out that in this case too, the ratio of second-best outcome to the first-best is small 
when α tends to zero or infinity (for the same reasons) and maximized at an interior level of α (again, see 
Figure 3a). 
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to those under the first-best, is maximized when the CEO’s contribution to cash flows is neither 
too large nor too small relative to the manager’s contribution.  
Proof: Omitted (available upon request). 
2.4. Some implications 
 We have shown that internal governance can be moderately effective in disciplining the 
CEO’s actions, and ensuring the firm creates value. Even though the CEO cares only about today, 
while the manager cares only about the future, because of their mutual interdependence, they 
have the incentive to act in the broader interest. This is brought out starkly by Proposition 1, 
where once either party becomes irrelevant to the generation of cash flows, the second best 
solution becomes very inefficient relative to the first best. 
Cash flow correlation with investment 
Interestingly, internally-governed firms may naturally display a correlation (“sensitivity”) 
between investments and current cash flows. The rationale is as follows. Managerial effort 
anticipates future business conditions and also responds to the CEO’s current investments. Since 
the CEO’s current investment is driven by the need to motivate effort so as to enhance current 
(not future) cash flows, it will be driven by current business conditions. Since current business 
conditions drive both cash flow and investment, there is a correlation between the two even after 
controlling for future business conditions.  
To see this, we report in Figure 3b  the coefficients from regressing investment 
normalized by past capital stock ( )1/t ti k − on cash flows ( )1/t tCashflow k − and business 
conditions ( )1tθ + , from a simulation of 500 periods around our benchmark example, where each 
period, business condition is drawn to be a random variable that is uniformly distributed 
( )1 [0.5,1.5]t Unifθ + ∼ . The regression is designed to match closely the kind of regressions 
employed in the investment-cash flow sensitivity literature starting with Fazzari, Hubbard, and 
Peterson (1988). The figure shows that the sensitivity of investment to cash flows in our model is 
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the highest when the relative importance of CEO ( )α is low and declines monotonically as  α  
increases. The intuition is that when α  is low, managerial effort is the primary determinant of 
cash flow, and it responds positively to CEO-determined investment -- hence, the stronger 
correlation.  
In our model, cash flows are sufficient to undertake investments. The correlation emerges 
not because firms are credit constrained (unlike Fazzari, Hubbard, and Peterson (1988)) but 
because of a common factor driving investments and cash flows. Indeed, Kaplan and Zingales 
(1997) suggest that it does not appear that many firms that have high cash flow investment 
correlations actually face financial constraints. 
Temporary shocks to business conditions  
Better current business conditions increase the CEO’s incentives to invest, even though 
they have no direct influence on the cash flows produced by the investment, because of the 
indirect effect they have on managerial incentives. Similarly, the current capital stock also alters 
investment incentives because it alters the value of eliciting managerial effort. If business 
conditions fluctuate a lot, especially in the downward direction, these dependencies may lead to 
significant inefficiencies.   
As an illustration, consider Figure 3c wherein we retain all parameters as in the earlier 
cases but “shock” the business condition at date t=1 to two possible values of θ1 = 1.5 or 0.5 
compared to the steady-state value θSS = 1.  Even though an unexpected temporary shock to 
business conditions should not affect investment for the future, as the plot shows, the investment 
in period t=1 moves substantially (depending on the shock), taking about four CEO tenure 
periods to revert to the steady-state (once business conditions revert to the steady-state starting at 
t=2). Intuitively, an adverse current shock to business conditions reduces current investment. This 
then reduces the capital stock next period, and reduces incentives to invest next period (and also 
managerial effort) even though business conditions have returned to normal. Thus shocks have 
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persistence in our model of internal governance – recessions are likely to be more prolonged in 
economies where internal governance predominates. 
 If, however, business conditions are stable, the differing horizons of the CEO and the 
manager (the former focused on contemporaneous cash flows, the latter on future cash flows) 
could combine to make cash flows, appropriately sensitive to business conditions. This is what 
we see both in (1.16) and (1.17), where, in steady state, the ratio of second best to first best 
capital stock or cash flows do not depend on business conditions. It is in this sense that internal 
governance may work best when conditions are stable, rather than when conditions fluctuate 
(especially downwards) dramatically. 
2.5. Varying Assumptions 
Improvements in External Enforcement 
What would happen if external institutions such as courts were strengthened so as to 
increase the costs of appropriation (for example, by increasing the propensity of courts to 
investigate and punish such appropriation). In the model, this is modeled by assuming the CEO 
expects to get only β  of the cash flows he appropriates (with (1 )β− of the cash flows being lost 
because of the defensive action he has to take vis a vis the police and courts). The CEO now 
maximizes ( )1 1[ ( ) ( )] ( )CEO SBt t tt tk f s g s k kγβ θ − −⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦+ − −  w.r.t. tk . His marginal net return 
from investing is still ( )1 1SBtt t
t
dsk g
dk
γθ − ′ − , which is the same form as before because both 
his return from appropriation and his opportunity cost of investment are reduced by the 
same multiplier, β . The change comes in the manager’s incentives, because she now 
maximizes ( )1 1 1[ ( ) ( )] ( )1 t t t tt t tk f s g s k k sr
γβ θ + + +⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦+ − − −+ , and has a lower incentive to 
exert effort because future rents are lower.  
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 Indeed, for the functional form of g and f we have used earlier, we can show that the 
second best capital stock also falls as β falls.11 Because the manager no longer sees as many rents 
in the future, her incentive to exert effort falls, and the CEO’s desire to invest in order to 
incentivize that effort also falls. Thus in a world where internal governance is the primary source 
of managerial incentives, limiting rent extraction, for example through outside courts, can reduce 
overall value creating. 
Ownership 
Finally, we have been silent about who owns the capital stock (since the CEO 
appropriates everything, there are no residual cash flows apart from amounts invested in the 
capital stock). One view is that the capital stock consists of intangible or non-tradable assets such 
as human capital or relationships. In that case, what we have described is a partnership (with the 
CEO having control because of his superior ability to perform the functions of the CEO). An 
alternative view is that the assets are tangible and tradable, but they are owned by outside equity 
owners who have no control rights. We will shortly examine what happens when they do acquire 
control rights. 
The Power to Appoint 
We also have not examined the process by which managers are appointed. If there are 
substantial rents associated with being CEO, the appointing agent could well recoup these rents 
from managers when they are appointed by paying them below market wages. Alternatively, it 
may be that managers have no wealth at the time of appointment (and their salaries are too low, 
even collectively, for them to pay over time for the rents they would get as CEO). In that case, 
CEO appropriation is a pure rent going to those who are lucky enough to get into the firm. These 
                                                 
11 It can be verified that 
( )
( 1)
1 (1 )
1
11
(1 )
b
b
b
t tt
t
k
k
r
γ γγθθ β
α
−
− +
−
−+
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟= ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟+ ⎝ ⎠⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
and 1
( )1
(1 )
b
t t
t
ks a
b r
γθ β+⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞⎢ ⎥= − + ⎜ ⎟+⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
, 
both of which increase in β . 
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different views matter when we consider the firm value that can go to outsiders. Under the first 
assumption, if outsiders control appointment, firm value is maximized when inefficiencies from 
investment distortion and effort distortion are minimized – CEO misappropriation is “paid for” up 
front and is thus irrelevant apart from the distortions it creates. Under the second assumption, 
CEO misappropriation is a cost to outside claimholders, in addition to the costs of the distortions 
it creates. 
 2.6. Essential aspects of the mechanism of internal governance 
 We have assumed external governance to be weak, that the CEO’s objective function has 
no forward looking components, and that the CEO is self-interested – the future welfare of the 
firm or its employees has no weight in his objective function. All this can be relaxed.  
But our goal is to see precisely what conditions are necessary for internal governance to 
work and to see where it could be an important support to corporate performance. Consider the 
necessary ingredients: the CEO should believe that undertaking a future-oriented action should 
increase current cash flows, and thus his take, today. Clearly, this requires key stakeholders to be 
interested in the future, even if the CEO is not. For instance, the airlines who buy from an 
airplane manufacturer would be most interested in its continued health (if nothing else, so that 
spare parts continue to be available), and would likely reduce their purchases if they saw too little 
investment. Exit by customers is therefore one source of discipline (see Hirschman (1970), 
Titman (1984)). Customers are, however, typically at a distance, and leaving aside the purchase 
of high value durable goods or large amounts of intermediate goods, are unlikely to be 
appropriately informed or concerned about a supplier’s future health. 
This then leaves employees as the stakeholders most concerned and most able to observe 
and do something about mismanagement. Again, whether they can be a reliable part of a 
mechanism of internal governance depends on whether they have a sizeable long term stake in the 
firm. This requires some firm-specific rents. The rents may come from some specific ability that 
is possessed only by top management that have served an apprenticeship inside the firm. The 
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absence of such rents, either because external governance severely limits what senior 
management can appropriate, or because top management in the industry is interchangeable 
across firms, would render internal governance ineffective. 
A second requirement for effective internal governance is that the actions the managers 
need to take to enhance current cash flows also contribute to acquiring future rents.12 If, for 
example, the actions are unrelated to the firm-specific rents because they are rewarded anyway in 
the market place – the manager works hard because performance can be observed by other firms, 
and they will pay more for a good performer – then the prospect of acquiring firm-specific rents 
will not motivate actions. Thus it is only if learning effort results in firm-specific knowledge that 
does not translate easily to other firms, or if effort leads to a greater prospect of within-firm 
promotion, that effort and rents will be linked.13 
Also, the desired action by the CEO should lead to more learning effort by managers. 
Investment in our model is assumed to have that character. But one could envisage situations 
where weaker actions by the CEO lead to more compensating effort by the managers. What, for 
example, if managers greatly feared the opprobrium and the reputational taint associated with bad 
corporate performance? More underinvestment by the CEO might lead them to greater effort as 
they struggled to keep the firm out of bankruptcy. Of course, countries or situations where 
external governance is weak are also likely to be situations where the market inflicts few 
reputational penalties. 
Finally, we have assumed that the CEO cannot force employees to produce the desired 
level of effort. However, this is not critical. As we will see later, even if managerial actions can 
                                                 
12 We have assumed that the manager’s effort also pays off directly in the future, since it determines his 
capability as CEO. This link is not strictly necessary. If the manager’s effort is critical in generating the 
cash flow necessary to make the investment, then the manager’s effort could be linked to the future via 
investment. We have not explored this link (we thank Mark Rubinstein for suggesting it).   
13 Employees could, of course, be mobile but not be able to monetize their learning – for instance, because 
it is firm-specific or because other firms cannot verify the quality or extent of the learning, and therefore 
hesitate to promote the imported employee into a leadership position. This would be sufficient for us to 
obtain the desired effects. 
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be coerced so that incentives are not needed, internal discipline can be imposed on the CEO 
through the need to hire new employees. 
In summary, the existence of future firm-specific rents can make employees far more 
effective in exerting internal governance. However, they do not do this by asserting voice 
(probably an easy way to get fired) in Hirschman’s terminology, but by reducing effort or by 
being reluctant to join. None of this needs any coordination on the part of employees, or any 
appeal to the Board or to forces of outside control. 
2.7. Connections to the Literature 
Our model resembles Fama (1980) where concerns about the adverse reputational consequences 
of misappropriation on his post-retirement career keep the CEO on the straight and narrow. In 
contrast to the ex-post settling up in that model, the settling up in our model is contemporaneous 
and by parties whose interests are intimately involved – employees endogenously penalize 
excessive misappropriation. The difference is important, for instance in explaining the effects of 
capital structure.  
We are, of course, not the first to analyze the phenomenon of internal governance. Fama 
and Jensen (1983 a and b) as well as Hansmann (1996) refer to mutual or internal monitoring, 
though they do not undertake a detailed analysis. Unlike Landier, Sraer, and Thesmar (2006), we 
do not appeal to the independence of top executives (as measured by their having preceded the 
CEO into the firm). Instead, we rely on their self interest - the fact that they typically have career 
concerns inside the firm. The mechanism through which they have impact is not through 
coordinated action or through appeal to a Board, but through their propensity to get de-motivated. 
This is neither exit nor voice, in the felicitous terminology of Hirschman (1970), nor active 
whistle-blowing as in Dyck, Morse and Zingales (2007), but an uncoordinated, even implicit, 
strike.  
Our model of internal governance in a setting with overlapping generations of short-term 
CEO and managers vying for the CEO role next period is similar in spirit to the model sketched 
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by Allen and Gale (2000, Chapter 12), though the details are quite different. Allen and Gale stress 
the role of complementarities between the CEO and managers in cash flow production (and hence 
the need for the CEO to elicit co-operation). This can lengthen the horizon of myopic decision-
makers. They appeal to the implications of such a model to explain and help understand the 
relative merits of the “stakeholder”-focus of governance of Japanese firms at one extreme and  
the “shareholder”-focus of Anglo-Saxon firms at the other extreme, with French and German 
firms somewhere in between.14  
Similar to Allen and Gale (2000), Landier, Sraer, and Thesmar (2008) focus on situations 
where CEO and manager actions are complementary, and examine the role of optimal dissent in 
an organization. Intuitively, it is easier for a CEO to persuade the manager to follow him down 
the wrong path when they have similar private preferences over projects. Managers with different 
preferences would place greater constraints on the CEO, but at the cost of them being less 
enthusiastic when the CEO’s project choice correctly accords with his own preferences.  
Unlike in both these models, the primary link between the CEO and managers in our 
model comes from investment. This allows us to explore a variety of additional issues including 
the life cycle of a firm and external governance. Let us now turn to these issues.  
III. Outside Equity 
 
Thus far, we have examined a simple model where outside capital plays no role in constraining 
top management. In particular, top management was constrained in its opportunism only by the 
rest of the organization. In practice, the CEO’s actions will also be constrained by the product 
                                                 
14 Allen, Carletti and Marquez (2007) study the effect of stakeholder capitalism in a setting where firms’ 
concerns about employees and suppliers soften competition in product markets and enhance shareholder 
value. A model that is somewhat less related to ours in a modeling sense, but germane in an overall sense, 
is that of Kreps (1990) on the role played by reputation effects in lengthening decision-making horizons of 
myopic agents. Kreps considers a model where an overlapping set of managers co-operate, by mutually 
trusting each other, since a manager next period buys the reputational capital of the current manager and 
this keeps the current manager in check, preventing defections motivated by short-termism. In contrast to 
Kreps, our CEOs cannot sell the firm to subordinates. 
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market (see Titman (1984) and Scharfstein (1988)), the capital market, and the market for 
corporate control. In what follows, we will focus on the capital market, leaving the disciplinary 
role of other markets in the context of our framework to future work. Interestingly, capital 
markets may not play as much of a role in “disciplining” the firm’s management, as in moving 
the firm to a better equilibrium.  
3.1. Outside Equity 
We will examine outside equity, which has several interesting features, though our point 
can be made more generally for other forms of outside capital. To allow a role for external 
control, let us assume that the beginning-of-period capital stock consists of tangible assets that 
can be seized and sold by outside capital. 
 As before, we assume the CEO can make a commitment at the beginning of the period to 
make some portion of the cash flows verifiable. Now, though, he can use the verifiable portion 
not only to make investments but also to pay a dividend. Initially, it will be useful for notational 
convenience to assume he sets each amount separately, though we will later show that all that 
matters is he can commit to the total that is made verifiable, and his choice of how much to invest 
and how much to pay in dividends emerges endogenously.  
Following Fluck (1998) and Myers (2000)  we model outside equity holders, working 
through the board, as having a simple control right – the right to take the firm’s capital stock at 
the beginning of each period if they believe the firm’s announced dividend, td , out of cash flow 
is inadequate. In the beginning of period t, outside equity thus has the right to take 1tk − . It will 
leave the assets in for one more period if it gets an adequate return for leaving them in, that is, if 
1(1 )t t td k r k −+ ≥ +  where r is the required rate of return on equity.  We first analyze the 
dividend and investment decisions of a going concern (where equity was issued in the past); then 
calculate the value of equity at IPO stage; then, we examine the CEO’s investment decision at 
time of IPO; finally, we discuss the efficiency of outcomes under equity financing. 
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Going concern 
 The new wrinkle is that when the CEO invests capital, he not only gives the manager 
more of an incentive to invest, he also gives outside equity a harder claim on the firm’s cash 
flows. The enforceable payment to outsiders will reduce the manager’s rent in the future. 
Therefore, we will need to pay attention to the manager’s participation constraint now. 
Interestingly, from all this we will derive a theory of dividend policy. 
 The going concern CEO’s maximization problem is 
 ( )1 1,max [ ( ) ( )] ( )t t CEOt t t t t tk d k f s g s k k d
γθ − −+ − − − , (1.18) 
 1. . (1 )t t ts t k d r k −+ ≥ +  (1.19) 
 ( ) ( )1 1 1 1ˆ
1 ˆ ˆarg max [ ( ) ( )] ( )
1t
t t t t t t t t t
s
s k f s g s k k d s
r
γθ + + + +⎡ ⎤∈ + − − − −⎣ ⎦+  (1.20) 
 ( ) ( )1 1 1 1
1( ) [ ( ) ( )] ( ) 0
1t t t t t t t t t t
and U k k f s g s k k d s at s
r
γθ + + + +⎡ ⎤= + − − − − ≥⎣ ⎦+ (1.21) 
  
Differentiating the expected utility ( )tU k of the manager w.r.t. tk , we get 
( )1 11 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 11 1 tt t t t t t t
dsU k k f s g s r k f s
r r dk
γ γθγ θ− +′ ′⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= + − + −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦+ + .
15 The second 
expression is zero (the Envelope Theorem), so ( )1 11( ) ( ) ( )1t t t tU k k f s g s rr γθγ − +′ ⎡ ⎤= + −⎣ ⎦+ .  
The term in square brackets, which is the cash return on investment less the amount that 
has to be paid to outside equity, can be negative. Intuitively, a higher capital stock implies the 
manager puts in more effort, but it also requires the manager to pay equity more next period. If 
the returns on investment are sufficiently low, the manager’s utility can be reduced by more 
capital stock. This should be contrasted with the earlier case where we had no outside equity (and 
hence no negative term in the square brackets), when more capital stock always increased the 
utility of the manager.   
                                                 
15 We are assuming here that 1 1( )t t t tk k d rk+ +− + = , for this is the interesting case when ( )tU k starts 
mattering. 
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Let us now return to the CEO’s maximization problem. Let 1λ  be the Lagrangian 
multiplier for the dividend constraint (1.19) and let 2λ be the multiplier for the manager’s 
participation constraint (1.21). The CEO’s first order condition w.r.t. td is 
          11 λ− +                 (1.22) 
and w.r.t. tk is 
 1 1 21 ( )tt t t
t
dsk g U k
dk
γθ λ λ− ′ ′− + +  (1.23) 
Complementary slackness requires that   
 ( )1 1(1 ) 0t t tk d r kλ −+ − + =  (1.24) 
 2 ( ) 0tU kλ =  (1.25) 
Now let us describe what this means for dividend policy and investment. First, if  
1(1 )t tk r k −≥ + , then 1 0λ =  (from (1.24)), which means that it does not make sense to pay 
dividends (from (1.22)). Intuitively, the capital stock left behind at the end of the period is more 
than enough to meet the equity holders’ rate of return constraint, so they do not need to be paid 
more in dividends.  
Second, when the manager’s participation constraint ( )tU k is satisfied with slack, 
2 0λ =   (from (1.25)). This means that the return for the CEO from satisfying the dividend 
constraint by increasing capital stock is 1 11tt t
t
dsk g
dk
γθ λ− ′ − + , which beats the return for the CEO 
from paying more dividends, which is  11 λ− +  when 0t
t
ds
dk
> . Intuitively, “paying” equity 
holders by increasing capital stock versus paying with cash dividends costs the CEO the 
same dollar of cash flow, but the former is better because the manager has more incentive 
to put in effort whenever  0t
t
ds
dk
> (which is always true in our framework so far). 
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This is an important point. It means the CEO will not pay cash dividends, and will 
instead increase investments to meet the rate of return requirements of equity holders, 
provided the manager’s participation constraint is met. In other words, in this region, 
1[ , (1 ) ]
SB
t t tk Max k r k −= +  where SBtk is the capital stock the CEO would set in the absence 
of outside equity.  
Finally, what happens when the intended capital stock becomes so high that the 
manager’s participation constraint is just met, so that ( ) 0tU k = . From complementary 
slackness, 2 0λ > . For well behaved functions (see below), the manager’s expected rents 
( )tU k first increase in tk and then decrease as diminishing marginal returns set in. This implies 
that ( ) 0tU k′ <  when ( ) 0tU k = . The CEO will have to meet the manager’s participation 
constraint by reducing the capital stock he sets at the end of the period, paying out 
Max[ 1(1 ) t tr k k−+ − ,0] as dividends. 
 The point here is that as the rate of return on capital falls, by investing more capital the 
CEO could make the manager worse off, because he increases the capacity of outside equity to 
extract value by more than he increases the capacity of the manager to generate cash (net of this 
period’s effort cost) as CEO next period. This is when the current CEO will switch to paying 
dividends.  
  For firms with well behaved expected utility for the manager (that is,
0
lim ( ) 0
k
U k→ > , 
lim ( ) 0
k
U k→∞ < , ( ) 0U k′′ < , and ( ) 0U k′ < for some k), and when the business environment is 
constant at t tθ θ= ∀ , we have 
Proposition 2: In the presence of outside equity, 
(i) The capital stock before the firm reaches steady state is 1[ , (1 ) ]
SB
t t tk Max k r k −= + .   
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(ii) The firm reaches steady state in period tˆ when ˆ ˆ 1 ˆ[ , (1 ) ]
SB
t tMax k r k k−+ ≥ where kˆ is such 
that ˆ( ) 0U k = . The steady state capital stock is kˆ  in period tˆ  and after, and the 
steady state dividend is ˆ ˆd rk=  in period ˆ 1t +  and after. 
(iii) In period tˆ , the dividend is  ˆ 1ˆ[ (1 ) ,0]tMax k r k −− + . The dividend before period tˆ is 
zero. 
Proof:  Omitted. 
 The proposition then suggests the life cycle pattern of dividend payments and investment 
that has been empirically observed. In the early stages of a firm (when tk is low), the capital 
investment by the firm will be more than enough to meet the return expectations of equity 
investors. No dividends will be paid. As the firm becomes more mature and rates of return fall, 
the capital stock the CEO would desire to put in place in the absence of equity could fall below 
the level needed to meet equity’s required rate of return. But now, the CEO will increase capital 
stock over the desired level instead of paying dividends because the higher capital stock has the 
collateral benefit of raising managerial effort. However, when capital stock is so high that raising 
it would violate the manager’s participation constraint, the CEO will start paying out cash 
dividends, the capital stock will stabilize (when the business environment is stable), and future 
CEOs will all be at their participation constraint – they will get no excess rents. 
An Example 
Let us go back to our example where  
11( ) ( ) ( )
1
b
b
t t tf s g s a bsb
α
−
= = +−  with a ≥ 0 and b >1 
and 
1
b
γ < . It is easily shown that  ( ) 11
( 1)( )
1 (1 ) 1
b
bt
t tb
rU k k
b r r
γα θ γ
α
−+⎡ ⎤+′ = −⎢ ⎥− + +⎣ ⎦
, which is ∞ as 
0tk → , and 1
r
r
− + as tk →∞ . Furthermore, ( ) 0tU k′′ < .  Finally, 
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( ) ( ) 11
( )1 1( ) (1 ) ( )
1 (1 ) ( 1) (1 )
b b
t t t
t t t t t t b
k b rkaU k k f s rk s
r b r b b r
γγ θ αθ α α
+
+
+⎡ ⎤= + − − = + −⎢ ⎥+ + − +⎣ ⎦ , which is 
a
b
as 0tk → , and −∞ as tk →∞ . Since ( )tU k′ is first positive, then negative, ( )tU k first 
increases from a positive number, then falls below zero, crossing zero at a single point. We can 
then map out dividend policy and investment for any set of parameters. 
For the case a = 0, we obtain ( )1 1( )ˆ ( 1) (1 )
bb
b
bk
b b r r
γ α θ
α
−
−
+= − + . Comparing this to the first-best 
steady-state capital, we obtain that  
 
1
1
1
ˆ ( )(1 )
(1 )(1 )
b
b
FB b
k b r
k b r
γ α α
γ α α
− −
−
⎛ ⎞ + +=⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ + + +⎝ ⎠
 (1.26) 
which converges to zero as α goes to zero and to (1 ) 1r
bγ
+ >  as α goes to infinity. Recall that 
this is in contrast to the case without outside equity, when the ratio of second-best to first-best 
capital goes to zero at both these limits. The intuition is the same as before when α goes to zero -
- when only managerial effort is critical, the CEO cannot incentivize the manager through 
investment since the manager’s effort will not pay off in the future when he does become CEO.  
But when managerial effort is not critical to current cash flows, the managerial participation 
constraint constrains the CEO less and less. The CEO then prefers to “pay” outside equity in 
capital, and outside equity “forces” the sequence of CEOs to grow the firm to a higher capital 
level before the firm reaches the steady state and starts paying cash dividends.  
  Outside Equity Owned Firms and Rents 
  Interestingly, in steady state, the CEO gets no rent in that his participation constraint is 
just met – he appropriates just enough after paying equity to compensate for his effort. But 
because he can appropriate all the cash flows at the margin, he has the maximum possible 
incentive to exercise effort. Indeed, if the firm cannot appropriate cash flows from the future, it 
cannot give him a better incentive scheme based on cash compensation, even if effort were 
verifiable.  
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 The reason why rents are reduced to zero, despite a succession of rapacious CEOs, is 
interesting. Each CEO cares only about his take, and about the manager only to the extent that it 
impacts managerial effort. By raising capital stock, the CEO raises managerial effort but also the 
capacity of outsiders to extract their due. Eventually, future CEO rent will fall, even while 
managerial effort keeps increasing, but the current CEO is not concerned – he is doing to his 
successor only what his predecessor did to him. The self interest of each CEO then ensures that 
rents are driven to zero, even though outsiders have only crude control rights. 
3.2. IPO 
 Let us now see what happens earlier, when the CEO takes the firm public through an 
initial public offering (IPO) in period τ . The above analysis implies that for a stable business 
environment θ , there is a period T at the end of which the value received by outside equity 
holders becomes fixed at Tk . Beyond period T, either the CEO grows the capital stock at rate 
(1 )r+ or he pays dividends of r times the capital stock, or he does some combination of growing 
the capital stock and paying dividends (for one transition period). This implies that if the IPO 
takes place in period τ , the value of the equity issued is 1(1 )
T
T
k
r τ− ++ . 
In keeping with the spirit of our analysis, the CEO appropriates the proceeds from the 
offering entirely. The CEO chooses investment tk to maximize 
 ( )1 1 1[ ( ) ( )] ( ) (1 )CEO TT
kk f s g s k k
r
γ
τ τ τ τ τθ − − − ++ − − + +  (1.27) 
where Tk depends on kτ recursively through the investment decision of the going concern in the 
presence of equity: 1[ , (1 ) ]
SB
t t tk Max k r k −= + .  Now, the first-order condition for CEO’s 
investment is given by  
 ( )1 11 .(1 )TT
ds kk g
dk k r
γ τ
τ τ
τ τ
θ − − +⎛ ⎞∂′ − + ⎜ ⎟∂ +⎝ ⎠  (1.28) 
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Since the going-concern capital grows at least at the rate r before date T, 
1 0.(1 )
T
T
k
k r ττ
− +
⎛ ⎞∂ ≥⎜ ⎟∂ +⎝ ⎠
Hence, the CEO at the time of IPO has a (weakly) greater incentive to 
invest (for any level of capital stock) compared to the second-best in absence of equity. This is 
because a higher end-of-period capital stock also increases the proceeds he gets from the IPO. In 
a sense then, the ability to “sell” the firm lengthens the CEO’s horizon and gives him the 
incentive to invest more.  
We summarize this discussion in the following proposition: 
Proposition 3:  
(i) Once the firm goes public and before reaching steady state, the firm’s capital stock is 
always (weakly) higher than in the absence of outside equity.  
(ii) The steady state capital stock of the public firm can be greater or less than the first best 
steady state capital stock.  
 
IPO and Investment Growth: An example 
Now let us consider a private firm whose CEO decides to take it public at t=10, after it 
has reached (its private) steady state.16 In its private steady state, tk =0.0108. Figure 4a shows that 
in the period of the IPO, 10
IPOk = 0.285. Clearly, the IPO has boosted investment substantially (and 
also managerial effort). The CEO would have little incentive to set this level of capital stock, 
were it not for the added incentive coming from the extra equity value he can raise through the 
IPO if he ups investment. Figure 4b shows that once the high level of capital is achieved in the 
IPO stage, capital continues to grow sharply (in a convex manner) until it hits a growth rate equal 
to the return on idle capital (r). Figure 4c illustrates that in this “growth phase”, the firm pays 
outside equity only in capital and there are no cash dividends. What is the current manager or 
                                                 
16 The parameters for this example are the same as before with θSS = 0.2.  
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future CEO’s utility over this growth phase? Figure 4d plots this utility net of the effort incurred 
in learning as a manager. At the IPO stage and in the initial growth phase, this net utility (U(k)) 
rises steadily but declines sharply once capital grows to a level where diminishing returns to scale 
kick in. Once the utility reaches the reservation level of zero, each current CEO cannot grow 
capital any further (Figure 4b) without violating his manager’s participation constraint (Figure 
4d) and thus is forced to pay outside equity in the form of cash dividends (Figure 4c). The firm 
thus switches from its extraordinary growth phase to steady-state capital with stable cash 
dividends.  
 What is it that the IPO does to make a small stagnant firm explode with energy? 
Interestingly, it is not the financing. One reason why the firm expands is the IPO changes the 
CEO’s investment incentives in the period of the IPO. But this would not be enough for sustained 
growth, for in the absence of outside equity, both capital stock and effort would subsequently 
decline to the steady state. Outside equity prevents such decline in an interesting way; Subsequent 
CEOs are required to compensate outside equity, but allowed to defer payment by building 
additional capital stock. This immediately alters the investment incentives of future CEOs, 
ensuring also that managerial effort remains high. As a result, the IPO moves the firm to a better 
equilibrium. 
Control rights 
 It is noteworthy that even with crude control rights, outside equity has such an influence 
on the firm’s growth path. Indeed, in our framework, outside equity’s control rights are irrelevant 
so long as the firm is growing its capital stock at a rate greater than r .  It may well be then that 
outside equity has value at that early stage even if its control rights are weak to the point of non-
existence, so long as it will acquire them eventually. And as processes become more stable and 
well-defined, and as management become more professional and standardized (see Hellman and 
Puri (2002)), outside equity will acquire the capacity to threaten to replace management. Thus 
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internal governance may be sufficient to preserve substantial firm value initially, and when it 
weakens, external governance may have become sufficiently developed to add support.   
Perhaps then this also explains why firms in emerging markets can issue outside equity, 
even when minority shareholder rights are currently poorly protected; The firm’s resources will 
keep growing because of the pressures from internal organization, and the control rights 
exercisable by outside equity over these resources will improve over time as the country 
develops, and as firms become more clearly structured. These will eventually allow equity to be 
paid, and hence give it value long before equity protection is in place. 
3.3. Relaxing Assumptions. 
 We have assumed that the CEO appropriates all the residual cash flow, that he owns no 
equity, and that there are no secondary equity issuances. Let us relax all three assumptions at the 
same time. Let the CEO gets β  of the cash flows left after investments and dividend payments. 
Let us also assume that the CEO can appropriate Eβ  of the cash flows from any secondary equity 
issue, with the remaining being dissipated (we will allow for the possibility that Eβ β= , though 
it may be lower since the proceeds from an equity issuance can be tracked through various 
accounts and may be harder to alter than revenues or costs). Furthermore, let the CEO own a 
share ω of the existing stock. 
First note that, as shown earlier, before steady state is reached, * 1[ , (1 ) ]t t tk Max k r k −= + .  
where *tk is the value that the CEO would have chosen “naturally” (see below) and tk is the 
capital stock that is actually chosen.  
There are two more details we need to pin down before we can determine the value of 
equity. First, if * 1(1 )t tk r k −> + , the CEO effectively overpays existing equity. He could pay 
existing equity exactly 1(1 ) tr k −+  if he issued an additional * 1(1 )t tk r k −− +  of equity. The 
secondary equity offering will “dilute” the rights of existing equity because equity holders 
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collectively will still have claim only to the capital stock, which is unchanged by the secondary 
equity issuance. The CEO will dilute existing equity if the fraction of cash flows he can 
appropriate from a secondary issuance, Eβ , exceeds his share of the existing equity, ω .  In that 
case, the value of existing equity will be  1(1 ) tr k −+  at the end of the period, and the CEO will set  
( )* 1 1 1 1arg max [ ( ) ( )] ( ) (1 )CEO Et t t t E t t
k
k k f s g s k k k r k k
γβ θ β ω− − − −⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤∈ + − − + − + +⎣ ⎦⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦  
Note that the ability to issue secondary equity reduces the opportunity cost of an 
additional dollar of capital investment to the CEO to  Eβ β− . Essentially, by committing to 
leave behind more capital, the CEO can also raise more secondary equity, so the “personal” cost 
of capital is simply the difference in appropriability between the two. Thus capital investment 
goes up relative to the situation without outside equity, even ignoring the fact that the incentive to 
pay dividends in capital rather than in cash will also push up capital investment.  
More interesting, so long as the equity share the CEO owns, ω ,  is less than his ability to 
appropriate, Eβ , the equity share does nothing for CEO incentives to invest or refrain from 
appropriation. This is because the value of equity simply reflects the past value of capital stock.     
It is only when the CEO’s equity stake is high enough ( )Eω β> that the CEO stops 
diluting stock through secondary issuances. Now the value of equity can reflect future capital 
stock, much as it did in the case of the IPO discussed earlier, and the CEO may want to invest 
more when he owns more equity because in doing so, he enhances the value of equity.     
IV. Internal Organization 
  
 Thus far, we have examined the effects of capital structure on the incentives for internal 
governance. Let us now turn to ways the internal structure of the firm itself may affect internal 
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governance. Internal organization typically will alter the sensitivity of the manager’s effort to the 
CEO’s investment, and will thus affect outcomes. We explore how. 
4.1. Altering the relative importance of the CEO and of the manager. 
 We have seen that the relative importance of the CEO in producing cash flows, α , 
affects the strength of internal governance. There is an interior optimal level of α which 
maximizes the net cash flows produced by the firm. α  can be altered by changing the 
responsibilities of the CEO and the manager. For instance, if α is too high, implying the CEO 
takes on too much responsibility and leaves too little to subordinates, as is typical with many 
small firms, more tasks can be devolved to subordinates. Indeed, one of the roles of a venture 
capitalist might be to “professionalize” the firm (see Hellman and Puri (2002)) by bringing in 
professionals and decentralizing more of the founder’s functions to them. Not only does this 
allow more external control of the firm, it can also lead to better internal control. 
4.2. Probability of promotion and firm size. 
 We have assumed that the manager is fully assured of being promoted next period, and is 
the sole possible successor. Furthermore, we have assumed that no additional managers are 
needed as the firm’s capital stock grows. What if, instead, more managers are needed as the 
firm’s capital stock grows, and each manager’s chances of promotion fall proportionately?   
 Suppose therefore that ( )tN k managers are needed to produce with tk of capital stock 
and each manager’s chance of getting the CEO’s rents are  
1
( )tN k
, with 0N ′ > .17  Modifying 
the manager’s maximization problem in (1.6)  and following some simple algebra, we have 
'SBt
t t
ds f N
dk f k N
γ⎡ ⎤′−= −⎢ ⎥′′ ⎣ ⎦ . This has to be positive for the current CEO to want to invest to motivate 
                                                 
17 We assume other managers leave when they do not get the top job. The issue of how the CEO is selected 
and whether the Board can extract rents from managers when appointing one to the job is interesting, but 
left to future research.  
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effort, and will be the case if 
t
N
N
k
γ ′> , that is, if the marginal rate of growth of managers with 
additional capital stock is significantly less than the average managers per unit of capital. Put 
differently, if there are scale economies in management ( N is concave so the number of 
managers does not increase as fast as the capital stock), then internal governance can still have 
salutary effect on incentives because, even though a larger capital stock means more managers, 
the associated rents grow disproportionately compared to the number of managers who expect to 
share it. But if, for example, there are scale diseconomies in management ( N is convex), then 
internal governance becomes unable to provide the CEO incentives for investment beyond a 
certain level of capital stock – managers see too little possibility of future rents to be motivated 
by CEO investment, and consequently the CEO does not invest. This will limit the size of the 
firm. 
 Interestingly, the possibility that once the firm reaches a certain size, managers may get 
demotivated by additional investment, suggests another rationale why the CEO may start paying 
outside equity in cash dividends rather than in more investment. Our model makes it clear that the 
reason for the CEO to  invest is not just to pursue growth, but also to motivate employees. The 
switch to cash dividends in our model could be a response to the second incentive no longer being 
operative (coming here from the effort response to additional investment rather than from the 
participation constraint, as earlier). 
4.3. Promotion Tied to Effort 
 In the case discussed above, one manager’s promotion was as likely as another’s, 
independent of the effort she exerted. What if a manager is more likely to get promoted if she 
exerts more effort, while if she does not exert much effort, it will be easier for the board to find a 
comparable replacement outside?   
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 To see how this would affect our results, let us go back to the case of one manager, but 
let her be promoted to CEO only with probability ( )tp s , where 0p′ > .  Again, modifying her 
maximization problem in (1.6)  and simplifying, we get 
SB
t
t
t
ds
dk p fk
p f
γ−= ′ ′′⎛ ⎞+⎜ ⎟′⎝ ⎠
. The CEO can 
provide more incentives for effort through investment if the right hand side is high. Comparing 
with (1.8), and recognizing the first term in the parentheses in the denominator is positive while 
the second is negative, we see that the firm can offer the best incentives for the CEO to invest if 
p
p
′
reaches its highest positive value (but below 
f
f
′′
′ in magnitude).  
Consistent with intuition, the manager’s effort will be more sensitive to CEO investment 
if her chances of capturing the future rent associated with the investment also increase in effort. 
Therefore, for any given probability of promotion, p , making promotion sensitive to effort will 
increase the strength of the internal governance effect. Conversely, any form of succession 
planning, which forces a high p while reducing p′ , would tend to diminish the importance of 
this effect. 18 
4.4. Labor Market, Reservation Wage, and Entry 
 Suppose now that the firm is in a competitive labor market where it has to hire the 
manager. It will have to pay the manager her reservation utility, u . Thus far, we have assumed 
future rents are more than enough to compensate for the (zero) reservation utility. What if the 
reservation wage is positive, implying the firm has to attract the manager away from other 
lucrative sources of employment, and that the manager’s anticipated future rents at the second-
best investment level are below the reservation wage. The CEO has a choice of paying for the 
                                                 
18 The sensitivity comes from comparing the effect of an increase in effort with the effect of an increase in 
investment, which is why p′ is scaled by p . A possible extension would be to examine the effects of an 
internal tournament between managers on CEO incentives to invest. 
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shortfall of future rents through a greater cash wage tw or through greater investment (which will 
give the manager greater future rents). To explore this, note the CEO’s maximization problem is 
( )1 1,max [ ( ) ( )] ( )t t CEOt t t t t tk w k f s g s k k w
γθ − −+ − − −  
s.t.   ( )1 1 11 [ ( ) ( )] ( )1 t t t t t t t tk f s g s k k s w ur
γθ + + +⎡ ⎤+ − − − + ≥⎣ ⎦+  
where ( )1 1 1
ˆ
1 ˆ ˆarg max [ ( ) ( )] ( )
1t
t t t t t t t t
s
s k f s g s k k s
r
γθ + + +⎡ ⎤∈ + − − −⎣ ⎦+  
Setting up the Lagrangian and taking the partial w.r.t. tk , we get  
( ) ( ) 11 1 11( ) 1 [ ( ) ( )] 11tt t t t t t tt
dsk g s k f s g s
dk r
γ γθ λ θ γ −− + +⎡ ⎤′ − + + +⎣ ⎦+ (where as in the section on 
outside equity, derivatives of managerial utility with respect to ts and 1tk + are zero by the 
Envelope Theorem). This means that we must have 
 
( )
( )
1
1
1 1
1 ( )
1 [ ( ) ( )] 1
1
t
t t t
t
t t t t
dsk g s
dk
k f s g s
r
γ
γ
θ
λ
θ γ
−
−
+ +
′−
=
⎡ ⎤+ +⎣ ⎦+
 (1.29) 
 
The numerator in this expression is the cost to the CEO of the marginal unit of investment – note 
that this is less than 1 because the CEO obtains some benefits from the manager’s consequent 
greater effort. Indeed, the numerator is zero at the unconstrained optimal. The denominator is the 
incremental rent the CEO generates for the manager next period through an additional unit of 
investment today. So if λ is less than 1, the CEO can generate more than a dollar of present value 
of rent for the manager tomorrow by incurring an incremental dollar of net investment cost today. 
Clearly, he would then prefer “paying through investment” than paying through cash, and would 
therefore exceed the investment he would make in the absence of a binding reservation wage. 
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 The alternative to paying the manager through investment is to pay through current wage, 
tw . Differentiating the CEO’s Lagrangian w.r.t. tw , we find the CEO wants to increase the 
current cash wage if 1λ > . Finally if λ starts out less than 1, as the CEO pushes investment 
higher λ could reach 1 (from below) before the CEO has met the reservation wage. In that case, 
he will pay part in investment and the remainder in cash wages.   
In sum then, if the CEO cannot meet the manager’s reservation wage with the promise of 
rents at the unconstrained second best optimal, she will have an incentive to invest above that 
today so as to generate the “currency” with which to pay the current manager her reservation 
wage. This is over and above any investment intended to elicit managerial effort. This then 
suggests that the need to entice managers to participate in the firm today may offer the CEO 
greater incentive to invest for the future.  
More generally, new recruits to the typical firm in the industry anticipate they will get 
future rents and thus are willing to settle for low initial salaries. To the extent that they see the 
CEO compromising the future, they will demand additional compensation, which can reduce the 
appropriable cash flows to the CEO substantially. Thus the CEO of a firm which requires a steady 
substantial intake of new entrants – either because its hiring in the past has been staggered or 
because it is on a fast growth path currently – will have strong incentives to not compromise the 
future, especially if the new entrants contribute quickly to the bottom line. 
V. Discussion and Conclusion 
 
 We have taken a simple model, indeed a caricature of managerial behavior, and taken it 
to its logical conclusions. Top management is both myopic and self interested, and the board 
ineffective. Yet, considerable value is preserved in the organization because of the need for top 
management to motivate younger managers who are needed to generate cash flows. Bottom-up 
governance could play an important role.  Indeed, a characteristic of many self-governing human 
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capital intensive organizations is that substantial rents are concentrated at the top, for example 
among partners. The watchful eyes of subordinates, who hope to gain access to those rents, can 
keep partners from milking those rents excessively as they age.  
 If internal governance is an important factor in a number of corporations and countries, it 
is worth considering whether the move towards ever-greater shareholder rights, public disclosure, 
and minority investor protection is always a good thing. In a second-best world, internal 
governance may reach where external governance cannot. But if the board, myopically exercising 
its functions, or forced by laws protecting investors, limits rents at the top, it might dissuade 
subordinates from focusing on the long term, and taking actions to dissuade egregious CEO 
misbehavior. Greater external governance may stunt internal governance. Of course, this is not an 
attempt to justify any and all payments to CEOs, only a comment that payments should be viewed 
from a broader perspective of trading off internal and external governance. 
 Many commentaries (see, for example, Baker and Wruck, 1988) suggest that the LBO 
partnership’s forte is not ever more intrusive micromanagement. Instead, it loads the firm up with 
debt, and gives top management considerable rents if they are able to pay down the debt and 
create value. If in addition to a motivated CEO, senior and middle management are motivated, not 
just by the prospect of current pay but by the prospect of participating eventually in the enormous 
rents at the top, it creates strong incentives for exercising internal governance. Thus the strength 
of going private transactions could, in part, be seen as their ability to reenergize internal 
governance, with external governance exercising just a crude control right. 
Our model also suggests why it may be so hard for firms to shrink gracefully, and why it 
may make sense for a firm (like Philip Morris)  in a mature, declining, industry like tobacco to 
diversify into a growing industry like food (by acquiring Kraft). If the firm were to stay in the 
declining industry, it would either have to overinvest or see a collapse of incentives, and worse, a 
collapse of the discipline imposed by internal governance. Rather than see the value destruction 
associated with such a decline, the second best option might be to “morph” into a new business. 
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Large old firms don’t just shut down, they transform themselves. What might be thought of as 
empire building by top management may be just a reaction to pressure from below. Indeed, Gort, 
Grabowski and McGukin (1985) find that unfavorable expectations of marginal returns to 
investment in existing businesses are an important spur to diversification, a finding consistent 
with the implications of our model, but also with others.  
 We would expect diversifying mergers by large firms in mature industries to be treated 
less harshly by the market than the typical diversification, with diversification being the least bad 
of the possible alternatives. There is some evidence of positive returns associated with 
conglomerate diversification programs (see Schipper and Thomson (1983)) for example, and with 
the conglomerate wave of the 1960s (see Matsusaka (1993) and Hubbard and Palia (1998)) but 
also strong evidence of a conglomerate discount (see, for example, Montgomery and Wernerfelt 
(1988), Lang and Stulz (1994), Berger and Ofek (1995)). Our explanation would be that 
diversification is better than the expected alternative of continued wasteful overinvestment in the 
existing business, but because the firm is not as good in the new business, or because of problems 
in managing an acquisition (see Rajan, Servaes and Zingales (2000) or Scharfstein and Stein 
(2000)), the diversified firm trades at a discount.  
The breakdown of internal governance may also explain the increasing evidence of 
agency problems in financial firms in the ongoing crisis. When capital is relatively scarce and 
allocated based on detailed information available only within a firm, employees of financial firms 
are relatively immobile. Each one cares about the longer term future of their own firm, and has an 
incentive to monitor the actions of both colleagues as well as superiors. As capital becomes more 
widely available, though, employees become more mobile, and care less about the long term 
future of their firm. The internal pressure to worry about the long term becomes weaker, possibly 
leading to the kind of problems we have seen.   
 Finally, our paper suggests a rich interaction between the internal structure of firms, the 
strength of internal governance, and the need for any external governance. Internal governance 
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may be quite effective in growing firms with young staff, where human capital is firm specific. 
By contrast, external governance may be much more important in mature firms in declining 
industries with aging staff where the required management skills are fairly generic. Countries like 
Japan that have had a rapid demographic transition may also have suffered as their old system of 
internal governance becomes less effective in a newer environment.  
 More generally, there is a rich vein of research to be mined in seeing the linkages 
between the internal organization of firms, internal governance, and external financing and 
governance. We have just touched the surface in this paper. More research clearly needs to be 
done.   
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Figure 2a: Convergence of investment in second-best 
to the steady state
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Figure 2b: Convergence of managerial learning in 
second-best to the steady state
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Figure 2c: Convergence of net cash flow in second-best to 
the steady state
3.25
3.45
3.65
3.85
4.05
4.25
4.45
4.65
2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
Time
N
et
 c
as
h 
flo
w
CF_SB (K_0 = 1)
CF_SB (K_0 = 0.01)
 
 
 
 
47 
 
 
48 
 
 
 
49 
 
 
 
 
50 
 
 
